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Housing bubble burst or credit crunch effect?  
Slovenia’s housing market
As  defined  by  the  Investment  Dictionary,  housing 
bubbles usually start with an increase in demand in the 
face of limited supply, which takes a relatively long pe-
riod of time to replenish and increase. At some point, 
however,  demand  decreases  or  stagnates  at  the  same 
time supply increases, resulting in a sharp drop in prices 
known as a bubble burst. During the last two decades, the   
Slovenian  housing  market  has  been  characterised  by 
a very high housing demand under circumstances of a 
limited supply, which may primarily be attributed to the 
effects  of  the  housing  reforms  introduced  in  the  early 
1990s. As is always the case in such situations, specu-
lators seeking huge quick profits drove house prices to 
unsustainable levels relative to average incomes. Like in 
many countries throughout the world, the situation has 
recently  changed.  Statistical  records  show  a  slight  de-
cline in the growth of house prices and there are signs 
of stagnation in housing demand. These developments 
have prompted various (contrasting) viewpoints among 
housing experts. Some are convinced that the bubble has 
finally burst because house prices had reached the highest 
possible levels that buyers were willing to pay. On the 
other hand, others argue that house prices would have 
continued to grow had the credit crunch not occurred, 
which resulted in the reduced availability of mortgages 
and therefore depressed demand. These two viewpoints 
represent the main hypotheses of this discussion. This 
paper reviews the housing market circumstances over the 
last two decades and identifies facts that may substantiate 
or disprove these hypotheses.Urbani izziv, volume 21, no. 2, 2010
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1  Introduction
The financial crisis began in the US in 2007 and soon spread 
globally through national and international banking relations. 
The first crucial reaction to the crisis was a loss of trust among 
banks. Banks became reluctant to lend to borrowers and, more 
importantly, to themselves. This led to the situation widely 
referred  to  as  the  “credit  crunch”  (Parkinson  et  al.,  2009; 
Stiglitz, 2009; Kitchin et al., 2010; Priemus, 2010, Yao et al., 
2010). Although real estate was the immediate victim of the 
credit crunch in many countries, there have been serious con-
sequences to global banking systems and economies as a whole 
(Parkinson et al., 2009). The financial crisis has resulted in the 
collapse of large financial institutions and forced governments 
into introducing emergency bailout measures in order to halt 
and prevent the worsening of the economic recession. In some 
countries, the housing market has been seriously affected, with 
occupants being evicted, foreclosures due to mortgage defaults 
(Bone & O’Reilley, 2008) and increases in the number of va-
cant dwellings (Kitchin et al., 2010).
With the economic crisis threatening to intensify worldwide, 
various governments implemented various counter-crisis meas-
ures intended to revive the economy. In some countries, the 
crisis measures led to slight optimism towards the end of 2009 
and it was hoped that the major economies of the world would 
start to show positive growth once again in 2010. On the other 
hand, the 2009 annual report on the Slovenian real estate mar-
ket observes that, while Slovenia still had positive economic 
growth in 2008, it turned out to be one of the countries se-
verely affected by the crisis in 2009 (Surveying and Mapping 
Authority of the Republic of Slovenia, Sln. Geodetska uprava 
Republike Slovenije, GURS, 2010). According to the report, 
economic activity declined sharply with a real fall of gross 
domestic product of 8.1% in 2009 as compared to 2008. The 
level of demand, both domestic and foreign, decreased con-
siderably. The number of people employed decreased and the 
average salary for workers in December 2009 was, in real terms, 
about the same it was at the end of 2008, despite 1.8% annual 
inflation. Average annual real estate prices also started to fall 
in 2009. Considering the level of transactions realised, 2009 
may be described as the year when the crisis became clearer. All 
of these facts provide evidence that the global financial crisis 
seriously affected Slovenia’s economy – which, of course, also 
includes its housing market.
Throughout the last two decades, the Slovenian housing mar-
ket has been characterised by a very high housing demand un-
der circumstances of limited supply. This state of affairs may 
primarily be attributed to the effects of the housing reforms 
introduced in 1991. As is always the case in such situations, 
speculators seeking huge quick profits have driven house prices 
to unsustainable levels relative to average incomes. However, 
as stated above, the situation changed significantly after the 
onset of the global financial crisis in 2007. Statistical records 
have shown a slight decline in the growth of house prices and 
there are signs of stagnation in housing demand. Both experts 
and non-experts are constantly offering predictions of future 
market  trends.  The  majority  of  them  predicted  sharp  falls 
in house prices immediately after the crisis emerged. At the 
time of writing this paper, however, there has not yet been 
any significant fall in house prices. On the contrary, house 
prices increased once again (although only slightly) at the end 
of 2009. This situation has created confusion among some of 
those  that  expected  significant  price  reductions.  Under  the 
circumstances,  these  developments  have  prompted  various 
(contrasting) viewpoints among housing experts. All in all, 
there is talk of a housing crisis in Slovenia.
This  paper  highlights  some  important  factors  that  may  be 
crucial in more accurately determining the causes and nature 
of the current housing crisis. There are generally two major 
explanations for the current housing crisis. In some circles, the 
crisis is believed to be due to the housing bubble burst that 
some experts have been announcing and expecting to occur 
for  several  years  now.  These  are  convinced  that  the  bubble 
has finally burst because house prices had reached the highest 
possible levels that buyers were willing to pay. Others see the 
current housing crisis as a direct consequence of the credit 
crunch, which reduced the availability of mortgages and led 
to eventual depressed demand. However, this paper stresses 
as vital to this debate the recognition that there has been a 
housing crisis in Slovenia for almost 20 years. Thus, all the dis-
cussions about a “current” housing crisis are purely academic. 
Essentially, it is argued that Slovenia’s housing crisis started 
in 1991, it continues to persist today, and there is no strong 
evidence on which to base hope for improvement in the near 
future. The analysis is based on a review of the general housing 
situation in Slovenia, with a particular focus on the events of 
the last 4 years (2007−2010). The major characteristics of the 
housing market are presented and, against this background, the 
conclusion suggests that there has been no residential “bubble 
burst” in Slovenia. A clear distinction is also made between the 
financial crisis and the credit crunch. This distinction makes it 
possible to conclude that the household housing market has 
been affected by the current global financial crisis (but not the 
credit crunch), whereas the construction industry, on the other 
hand, has been significantly affected by both the financial crisis 
and the credit crunch.
Below,  this  paper  identifies  the  facts  that  may  provide 
grounds for or against either of the above hypotheses. To 
this end, it is first of all necessary to state a working defini-
tion for a bubble burst and briefly describe the nature of the 
current credit crunch.
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1.1.  Housing bubble burst
According to the Investor Dictionary (see Internet 1), a real es-
tate bubble, property bubble or housing bubble for residential 
markets is a type of economic bubble that occurs periodically 
in local or global real estate markets. It is characterised by rapid 
increases in the valuations of real property such as housing 
until they reach unsustainable levels relative to incomes and 
other  economic  indicators,  followed  by  decreases  that  can 
result in many owners holding negative equity (a mortgage 
debt higher than the value of the property). A bubble burst 
is normally preceded by a credit explosion often facilitated by 
easy access to unconventional mortgages that enable people 
to take out bigger loans. Easy credit, and a belief that house 
prices will continue to appreciate, encourages many subprime 
borrowers to obtain adjustable-rate mortgages. This leads to 
a  building  boom,  which,  under  circumstances  of  economic 
prosperity, inevitably results in a house price explosion. Even-
tually, a surplus of unsold homes emerges on the market. At 
this point, prices peak and begin declining. This is when the 
housing bubble bursts.
Various authors have expressed various opinions on the ques-
tion of the bubble burst. Whereas Ansgar Belke and Marcel 
Wiedmann (2005) and Timothy Schiller (2006) wondered 
whether there was an excessive supply on the American hous-
ing market that could lead to a bubble burst, James Smith 
(2005) did not see any danger of a bubble burst occurring. On 
the other hand, a study by Eddie Hui and Shen Yue (2006) 
investigated whether the housing bubble had in fact already 
burst in Peking and Shanghai in 2003. A typical example of 
the conditions that lead to a bubble burst is described by Rob 
Kitchin et al. (2010) in their article on the consequences of 
the financial crisis on Ireland’s housing market. The authors 
note  that  in  2007,  Ireland,  along  with  Spain,  was  produc-
ing more than twice as many units per head of population 
than elsewhere in Europe. During the period described in the 
article as the “Celtic Tiger boom” Ireland experienced phe-
nomenal growth in property construction and house prices. 
“Both development and its underlying finances were allowed to 
become massively over-extended, creating an enormous prop-
erty bubble. Rather than the much hoped for ‘soft landing’, 
the bubble popped in spectacular fashion leading to a radical 
transformation of the property market, with tumbling house 
prices and widespread negative equity, and a collapse in con-
struction activity” (Kitchin et al., 2010: 2). The consequences 
and situation after the bubble burst in various countries have 
been discussed by various authors, including Andy Holloway 
(2008) for Canada, W. Erwin Diewert et al. (2009) for the US, 
Michael Parkinson et al. (2009) for the UK, Hugo Priemus 
(2010) for the Netherlands, Shujie Yao et al. (2010) for China 
and Kitchin et al. (2010) for Ireland. Although the majority 
of these discussions focus on economic aspects and their im-
pact on the housing market, John Bone and Karen O’Reilley 
(2010) adopt a multidimensional sociological approach that 
investigates specific experiences of individuals that were seri-
ously affected by the bubble burst in the UK.
1.2  Credit crunch
Parkinson et al. (2009: 4) define a credit crunch as “a sudden 
cut in the availability of credit or loans, including mortgages, 
credit cards and inter-bank lending as banks worry about a 
lack of liquidity”. The authors clarify further that under cir-
cumstances of a credit crunch lenders stop lending, borrowers 
cannot borrow, builders cannot build and buyers cannot buy. 
Because buying a home requires substantial financial resources 
usually  secured  by  taking  out  a  mortgage,  unavailability  of 
mortgages has the consequence of potential buyers not being 
able to buy. The credit crunch means that banks are reluc-
tant to lend to each other. Banks rely on the liquid transfer of 
cash between one another to fund their loans to buyers. When 
loans dry up, it becomes impossible for banks to finance risky 
mortgage deals like those seen over the past few years in some 
countries. If there are no mortgages available, buyers cannot 
buy houses. In the event of a long-lasting credit crunch situa-
tion, sellers may be forced to withdraw their property from the 
market or sell at a reduced price. The literature generally iden-
tifies two most important causes of a credit crunch, namely:
•	 A sustained period of careless and inappropriate lending, 
which results in losses for lending institutions and inves-
tors in debt when the loans turn sour; and
•	 A reduction in the market prices of previously overin-
flated assets.
In their article discussing the impact and implications of the 
current  credit  crunch  in  the  UK,  Parkinson  et  al.  (2009) 
identify the following specific events that sparked the present 
financial crisis in the US:
•	 A rise in interest rates led to a fall in US house prices 
from an annual rate of 20% in the second quarter of 2005 
to −4.7% in the final quarter of 2006;
•	 Mortgage defaults sharply increased;
•	 By the end of 2006, the value of subprime mortgage-
backed securities collapsed;
•	 The fall in mortgage market activity and the value of 
subprime mortgage-backed securities led to bankruptcy 
among several US mortgage lenders.
For the purposes of this analysis, it is important to stress that 
researchers  identify  two  characteristic  stages  of  the  credit 
crunch: the subprime crisis and the much wider financial cri-
sis generated by the pricing of other types of assets and the 
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consequent impact on the financing of the banking system. The 
subprime lending phenomenon has been widely discussed in 
the recent past by various authors (e.g., DiMartino & Duca, 
2007; Sanders, 2008; Shiller, 2008; Coleman, 2008; Parkinson 
et al., 2009; Issa 2010). They generally describe the subprime 
crisis as the result of irresponsible lending activities of bank-
ing and non-banking mortgage institutions with the principle 
aim of increasing the extent of lending in order to acquire 
more profit from interest. Subprime mortgages are essentially 
adjustable-rate mortgages granted to individuals with poor or 
low credit-repayment capacity. To make matters worse, such 
lending was carried out on the basis of mortgage-backed se-
curity (MBS) schemes. Invented in the US during the 1970s, 
for almost three decades mortgage-backed securitisation was 
regarded as one of the most important financial innovations 
in the real estate sector. The securitisation model enables the 
originating  bank  to  sell  the  mortgage  to  investors  through 
mortgage-backed  securities.  This  essentially  means  that  the 
originating bank passes on the risk to the investors and is no 
longer required to hold the mortgage to maturity. In this way, 
the originating bank replenishes its funds, enabling it to issue 
more loans and generating transaction fees (Pryke & White-
head, 1994; Stiglitz, 2009).
Contrary to the situation in many countries worldwide – for 
example,  the  US  (McKibbin,  2006),  UK  (Parkinson  et  al., 
2009), Ireland (Kitchin et al., 2010) and China (Yao et al., 
2010) – the MBS model described above does not apply in 
Slovenia. The country maintains a rather conservative banking 
system with built-in mechanisms that prevent the issuance of 
subprime mortgages. It is important to point out here that 
Slovenia has no specialised housing mortgage institutions. All 
loans for housing finance are provided by traditional commer-
cial banks. Most of these banks do, however, also offer some 
quasi-mortgage loans that, with respect to loan conditions, 
differ considerably from those normally offered by specialised 
mortgage  banks.  Characteristically,  commercial  banks  nor-
mally offer loans of shorter annuity periods with maturities 
between 10 to 20 years. Although maximum loan amounts 
rarely  exceed  30%  of  the  total  cost  of  the  property,  some 
banks are known to demand collateral far exceeding (even up 
to 300%) the loan in value. On top of this, Slovenian bank-
ing regulations require that banks approve loans only to ap-
plicants with permanent employment or with other forms of 
permanent income (e.g., pensioners). In addition, the monthly 
loan instalments must not exceed one-third of the applicant’s 
monthly salary. This measure is intended to prevent the en-
trance into the mortgage market of subprime borrowers with 
weak repayment capacity. All of this means that one cannot 
talk of a general subprime crisis in Slovenia. Instead, the effects 
of the global financial crisis on the housing market are more 
relevant to the local situation.
Given the circumstances described above regarding Slovenian 
banking standards, it may be concluded that it is not possible 
to talk of a credit crisis that would occur as a result of sub-
prime lending. It is vital to stress, however, that this argument 
applies only to individual lending (physical persons) and not 
to institutional lending (legal persons). Below it is argued that 
the wider global financial crisis is more relevant to the discus-
sion of the situation in the Slovenian housing market. Against 
this background, factors are presented and discussed that are 
conducive  to  determining  whether  the  current  situation  in 
the Slovenian housing market is the result of a cyclic bubble 
burst, a consequence of the credit crunch or perhaps simply a 
continuation of the previous situation that prevailed prior to 
the outbreak of the global financial crisis.
2  Main housing market 
characteristics
2.1  Housing supply
One of the key indicators of the efficient operation of a hous-
ing market is an appropriate balance of demand and supply. 
Slovenia’s housing market has been, and continues to be, un-
able to achieve any kind of semblance of equilibrium of supply 
and demand, in spite of the various policy measures that have 
been implemented in the past towards this goal. The market 
has been plagued by a critical shortage of supply since the 
introduction of housing reforms in 1991.
Housing policy in Slovenia is implemented by the government 
on the basis of the National Housing Programme (NHP), a 
document prepared by the Ministry of the Environment and 
Spatial Planning and adopted by the National Assembly (Sln. 
Nacionalni stanovanjski program, Ur. l. RS, no. 43/2000). This 
discussion focuses on the provision of the NHP adopted in 
2000, which stated, among other goals, the “need to increase 
gradually the level of new housing construction, intended to 
reach a production rate of 10,000 new dwellings per annum by 
the year 2009”. It should, however, be noted that, although the 
NHP was finally adopted by the National Assembly in 2000, 
housing policy was implemented (prior to its formal adoption) 
on the basis of the Draft National Housing Policy adopted 
by the government in 1995 (Sendi, 1995). Table 1 shows the 
rate of production of new dwellings after the introduction of 
housing reforms in 1991.
Although new housing production levels remained far below 
demand during the 1990s, the data in Table 1 show a gradual 
increase in annual production through the 2000s, especially 
from  2004  onwards.  Although  the  aforementioned  goal  of 
production of 10,000 new dwellings per annum by 2009 was  
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Table 1: Number of annual completions, 1991−2009.
Year No. of dwellings
1991 5,918
1992 6,492
1993 7,952
1994 5,522
1995 5,715
1996 6,228
1997 6,085
1998 6,518
1999 5,142
2000 6,460
2001 6,421
2002 7,265
2003 6,567
2004 7,004
2005 7,516
2006 7,538
2007 8,357
2008 9,971
2009 8,561
Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (1991−2009)
cation of non-profit rental housing announced periodically by 
the Ljubljana Municipal Housing Fund (LMHF). A detailed 
analysis of these calls reveals several important characteristics 
of  Slovenia’s  housing  market  regarding  supply  and  demand 
(Sendi, 2007). First, since the initial call in 1995, the LMHF 
has received a total of 15,879 applications for the allocation 
of non-profit rental housing. Of these, 3,000 applications were 
rejected for not satisfying the eligibility criteria, which means 
that  12,810  applicants  were  accepted  and  included  on  the 
priority list for allocation. It is, however, vital to note that 
the number of applications submitted to each call (1,134 on 
average) always far exceeded the number of dwellings on offer 
(134 on average). In other words, the number of applications 
received during this period exceeded the number of available 
dwellings by 843%. Thus, only a small number of eligible ap-
plicants were lucky to acquire housing in a particular call. Sum-
ming up, from 1995 until 2009 the LMHF was able to allocate 
only 1,912 dwellings out of a total of 15,879 applications. It 
is important to stress once again that, of this total number of 
applications, 10,898 applicants were not allocated dwellings 
despite the fact that they fulfilled the eligibility criteria. The 
final observation to be made here is that the fund is capable, 
on average, of providing housing for only 12% of the demand 
expressed through the municipality’s call for the allocation of 
non-profit rental housing. This analysis shows that there has 
always been a huge problem of access to affordable housing. 
The problem of housing affordability in Slovenia is further il-
lustrated by a comparison of average house prices and average 
wages (Table 2).
As the data in Table 2 clearly show, an individual earning an 
average salary would, on average, need 140 salaries (almost 
12 years) to be able to purchase a 50 m² apartment. This was 
the case before the financial crisis and continued to be the 
case after the crisis hit. A more detailed review of statistical 
data in fact shows that the affordability of housing in Slovenia 
deteriorated significantly from the early 1990s onwards, with 
house prices rising faster than earnings. There is therefore no 
basis for suggesting that the current financial crisis is to be 
blamed for the inadequate supply of housing in Slovenia and 
neither is the current crisis responsible for the country’s hous-
ing affordability problem.
2.2  Recent price trends
The report on the real estate situation in 2009 published by the 
GURS (2010) identified house price fluctuations in Slovenia 
in the third quarter of 2007, which followed the property bub-
ble burst in the US, as the first warning of a possible crisis in 
the country’s housing market. These fears became a reality at 
the beginning of 2008. The report observes that initially there 
was a reduction in the number of residential property transac-
nearly achieved in 2008, the figures for 2009 show a slight 
decline in production levels. Whether this is a sign of a down-
turn in coming years is not yet clear. However, this is worrying 
because the number of completions in 2009 ought not to have 
been affected by the financial crisis that hit Slovenia only in the 
middle of 2008, when previously planned developments un-
derway ought to have been approaching completion. As such, 
it is not yet clear what caused the decline in the number of 
completions in 2009. In any case this certainly has nothing to 
do with a bubble burst and, most probably, not even the conse-
quence of the credit crunch. What needs to be stressed in the 
discussion on housing supply is that new dwelling production 
levels have, throughout the last two decades, lagged far behind 
demand levels. The data presented in Table 1 enable two major 
observations in support of the hypothesis. First, since 1975 
there has been no housing construction boom in Slovenia of 
the magnitude described earlier for the case of Ireland. Even 
the target set by the NHP (10,000 dwellings per annum) was 
not achieved. As such, demand continues to exceed current 
supply. According to the working definition, a bubble is cre-
ated by excessive growth in housing construction and the con-
sequent supply surplus, and so the evidence presented above 
shows that the conditions for a bubble burst to occur were 
not fulfilled. It may thus be concluded that there has been no 
bubble burst on the Slovenian housing market as yet.
The  huge  gap  between  supply  and  demand  (especially  in 
Ljubljana) is best illustrated by the results of calls for the allo-
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Table 2: Housing affordability in Ljubljana.
Year Average price  
(€/m²)
Average price  
for a 50 m² apartment (€)
Average monthly salary 
(€)
No. of salaries  
for a 50 m² apartment
2005 2,023 101,150 775.87 130
2006 2,408 120,400 821.80 146
2007 2,612 130,600 887.58 147
2008 2,704 135,200 945.99 143
2009 2,596 129,800 963.94 135
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia and SLONEP (see Internet 2).
tions while house prices continued to grow. This increase is 
explained as due to the fact that the majority of sales completed 
were for better-quality and therefore relatively more expensive 
housing, whereas poorer-quality housing that was being of-
fered for unrealistically high prices remained unsold. Although 
real estate transactions continued to fall, the report continues, 
house prices started to fall only in the third quarter of 2008.
The quarterly house price changes in the period from 2007 
to 2009 for Ljubljana and the national level are summarised 
in Table 3. As can be seen from the table, average prices of 
resale apartments in Ljubljana already fell slightly in the third 
quarter of 2007 before the global financial crisis hit Slovenia. 
They then increased in the first quarter of 2008, fell again 
in the third quarter of 2008 and continued to fall until the 
second quarter of 2009. There was a brief increase in the third 
quarter of 2009, which was followed, once again, by a slight 
fall at the end of 2009 (Table 3). The figures for the national 
level show an increase between the fourth quarter of 2007 and 
second quarter of 2008, followed by decreases during the next 
three quarters until the third quarter of 2009 and a slight rise 
in the last quarter of 2009.
The data presented in Table 3 enables two major observations 
in support of the hypothesis. First, the figures show that there 
was no explosion of house prices in the period preceding the 
financial crisis. It is true that house prices generally increased 
until the second quarter of 2008, but it is also vital to recognise 
that they have been fluctuating throughout this period. The 
growth in house prices has been steady but not phenomenal. 
Second, although house prices in Slovenia fell, for the first time 
(in the period 2007−2009) in the third quarter of 2008 and 
continued to fall gradually until the third quarter of 2009, they 
rather surprisingly increased once again in the fourth quarter 
of 2009, both in Ljubljana and at the national level.
Referring back to the working definition of a bubble burst, it 
may therefore be concluded that the situation in Slovenia does 
not warrant the declaration of a bubble burst because there was 
no rapid and sharp increase in house prices as was described 
in the case of Ireland. On the other hand, the financial crisis 
appears to have played some role in the fall (at least briefly) of 
Table 3: Average prices of resale homes in Ljubljana and Slovenia 
by quarter, 2007−2009.
Year Quarter Ljubljana  
(€/m²)
Slovenia  
(€/m²)
2007
1/4 2,550 1,640
2/4 2,700 1,750
3/4 2,760 1,640
4/4 2,640 1,740
2008
1/4 2,760 1,850
2/4 2,820 1,930
3/4 2,720 1,850
4/4 2,640 1,800
2009
1/4 2,480 1,710
2/4 2,350 1,680
3/4 2,470 1,670
4/4 2,460 1,730
Source: GURS (2010)
house prices in Slovenia. Because it is not clear at this moment 
what the situation will be like at the end of 2010, more time 
is required before a more accurate evaluation can be made.
2.3  Effect of the financial crisis on housing 
transactions
According to GURS data, real estate transactions generally 
reached the lowest level in the first half of 2009. As may be 
gathered from Table 4, the number of recorded transactions of 
residential property started to fall in the third quarter of 2007 
and continued to fall until the first quarter of 2009. In view 
of the circumstances that arose after the financial crisis, it is 
interesting to note that the number of housing transactions in-
creased once again in the second quarter of 2009. Furthermore, 
the data show that the number of apartment transactions in 
the first quarter of 2009 almost doubled in the fourth quarter 
of that year, whereas those for houses more than quadrupled.
The data presented in Table 4 show a 19% fall in the number of 
transactions for apartments and a 12% fall in the case of house 
sales after the onset of the financial crisis. The figures for 2009, 
on the other hand, indicate a constant growth of transactions 
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Table 4: Number of housing transactions by quarter, 2007−2009.
Year Quarter Apartments Houses
2007
1/4 2,578 1,174
2/4 2,766 1,496
3/4 2,889 1,530
4/4 2,770 1,526
2008
1/4 2,221 1,261
2/4 1,788 1,107
3/4 1,555 743
4/4 1,155 349
2009
1/4 997 209
2/4 1,037 332
3/4 1,587 816
4/4 1,957 893
Source: GURS (2010)
on the housing market once again. As such, the credit crunch 
does not appear to have had any significant impact on buyers’ 
purchasing capacity, although the number of transactions at 
the end of the fourth quarter of 2009 was below the levels 
achieved prior to the onset of the financial crisis in the mid-
dle of 2008. Given that houses are normally purchased with 
the help of a loan, it may be deduced further that the credit 
crunch did not significantly affect the level of accessibility to 
bank financing in individual housing investment.
2.4  Effect of the financial crisis on the level of 
new construction
It may be argued that the home-building industry is the real 
estate sector that has, undoubtedly, been hit hardest by the 
financial crisis. According to Eurostat data, in 2005 Slovenia 
was  ranked  behind  Slovakia,  the  Czech  Republic,  Poland, 
Romania and Bulgaria as the countries with the lowest con-
struction costs (European Commission, 2009). This enabled 
developers to earn high profits because the sales prices (es-
pecially in Ljubljana) were comparable to those in some of 
the most expensive European cities. However, the situation 
changed notably after the financial crisis. The developers’ ex-
pectations suddenly became unrealistic. Statistical figures show 
that the level of new construction decreased by more than 50% 
between December 2008 and December 2009. In addition 
to the reduction of investments in new construction, there is 
also a noticeable slowdown in the realisation of projects whose 
construction started before the crisis hit.
The situation in which some construction companies found 
themselves  after  the  onset  of  the  financial  crisis  may  be  il-
lustrated by the example of Vegrad, a construction company 
that was experiencing serious problems at the time of writing 
this paper. An article published in a major national newspa-
per reveals that the company’s net revenue from sales grew 
rapidly between 2002 and 2008 (Kovač, 2010). Concretely, 
before the onset of the crisis in 2008, Vegrad’s net revenue 
was 175% higher than that of 2000. On the other hand, the 
company’s nominal capital value increased by a mere €5 mil-
lion (from €19.7 million to €25.1 million) between 2000 and 
2009. During the same period, the total debt (financial and 
business operations) rose from €44.6 million to €237.6 mil-
lion – that is, fivefold. As Stanislav Kovač explains, the rapid 
growth of Vegrad’s operations was financed primarily through 
excessive borrowing, which in 2008 exceeded the level of 2000 
by 386%. He describes the behaviour of creditors as “gambling 
bankers that generously offered loans to the company despite a 
high quotient of financial leverage, which ought to have been 
an warning sign to every prudent banker that Vegrad had been 
a credit time bomb for several years” (Kovač, 2010: 10). At 
the time of writing this paper, the company was already in 
the process of liquidation. The case described above provides 
proof of the irresponsible lending practices of banks. As Yao 
et al. (2010) suggest in their analysis of the housing situation 
in China after the onset of the financial crisis, rising house 
prices made mortgage lending lucrative and attractive to banks 
and other financial institutions. As it later turned out, these 
practices had very serious consequences.
There is therefore no doubt that the financial crisis had a seri-
ous impact on the home-building industry. Banks have once 
again tightened loan requirements in the investment sector. 
Some companies (like the one described above) cannot even 
secure a loan from any bank. As such, it is possible to conclude 
that the financial crisis led to a credit crunch in the construc-
tion  industry.  The  credit  crunch  has,  in  fact,  also  seriously 
affected many banks, some of which are currently struggling 
hard to remain afloat.
2.5  The role of banks in financing housing 
investments by natural persons
For the purposes of this analysis, a request for information was 
sent to all Slovenian banks licensed to offer loans for housing 
finance. The request asked the banks to provide data on the 
number of loans approved by the bank to individuals in the 
period from 2000 to 2010 (the data for 2010 represents ap-
proved loans until August of that year). The aim of this brief 
survey was to more accurately investigate the level of bank 
activity in the provision of housing finance prior to and af-
ter the financial crisis. This information was intended to help 
establish with greater certainty whether and to what extent 
bank lending practices might also have led to the creation of 
the credit crunch in this area.
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Of the 20 banks included in the survey, only six responded 
positively with the information requested on private housing 
financing. Notwithstanding the relatively low level of response, 
the information obtained is nonetheless quite indicative. This 
is especially so because it was possible to obtain the required 
information from almost all the largest banks. It must be noted 
here that most of the banks that sent the data asked that the 
bank’s name not be published in this paper. The banks’ names 
have  therefore  been  replaced  with  letters  (i.e.,  Bank  A  to 
Bank F).
The data provided by Bank A show an annual increase in the 
number of loan approvals from 2003 (489) to 2007 (1,303), 
followed by a decrease from 2007 to 2009 (1,070). The main 
observation here is that the number of loans granted by the 
bank already decreased in 2007; that is, before the financial 
crisis hit Slovenia. The information provided by Bank B shows 
a steady increase in the number of loan approvals since 2000 
(85) to 2008 (1,183) and a reduction in 2009 (1,095). In the 
case of Bank C, the number of approvals increased from 2001 
(113) to 2006 (2,142) and then decreased from 2,119 approv-
als in 2007 to 1,694 in 2008 and decreased further in 2009 to 
975. It may be observed also in this case that the number of 
approvals decreased prior to the financial crisis. At Bank D, 
the number of approvals increased between 2002 (1,182) and 
2005 (4,917), decreased in 2006 (4,144), increased once again 
in 2007 (5,903) and decreased again in 2008 (3,913) and 2009 
(3,668). The data provided by Bank E show greater fluctuations 
in the level of loan of loan approvals throughout the last 10 
years. In comparison with 2000 (50), the number of approv-
als decreased in 2001 (38) and 2002 (30), increased in 2003 
(41) and 2004 (91), decreased in 2005 (80), increased in 2006 
(142), decreased in 2007 (133) and 2008 (96), and increased 
again in 2009 (136). The information provided by Bank E is 
particularly interesting because it shows that the number of 
approvals increased significantly in 2006 and then decreased 
between 2007 and 2008 before the financial crisis hit. Fur-
thermore, it is important to note that the bank approved more 
loans in 2009 (after the credit crisis hit) in comparison with 
2008. More surprisingly still, the number of approvals by Bank 
E for the period from January to August 2010 had already 
exceeded its total number of approvals for 2009. This is a clear 
indication that the financial crisis did not reduce the level of 
lending activity in individual housing finance. Like Bank E, 
the data obtained from Bank F show constant fluctuations 
in lending levels between 200 and 2000. In comparison with 
2000 (501), the number of approvals decreased in 2001 (424), 
increased in 2002 (521), decreased in 2003 (429), increased 
in 2004 (773), 2005 (896) and 2006 (1,007), decreased once 
again in 2007 (962) and 2008 (664), and increased again in 
2009 (941). Bank F also approved more loans in 2009, 42% 
more than the number of approvals in 2008.
Generally, there are two main conclusions to this short survey 
of bank activity prior to and after the onset of the financial 
crisis. The information provided by the banks shows that the 
financial crisis did not have a significant impact on bank lend-
ing activity in individual housing financing. Second, although 
the level of lending generally declined from 2008 to 2009, 
there is no certain evidence (as yet) that these reductions are 
due to the credit crunch. As has been shown, Banks E and F 
even increased their levels of loan approval in 2009. It may be 
concluded, therefore, that the practices of the Slovenia banks 
studied for private housing financing did not contribute to the 
eventual onset of the credit crunch, which, otherwise, occurred 
in bank lending to legal entities.
3  Conclusion
It has been argued throughout this discussion that much of 
Slovenia’s housing market has not been significantly affected 
by the credit crunch. This, however, does not mean that the 
market has been immune to the effects of the global financial 
crisis. The fundamental viewpoint promoted here is that Slov-
enia’s housing market problems have a long tradition, such that 
one needs to be very cautious before declaring bubble bursts 
or credit crunch effects. This recalls the core questions of the 
paper: namely, has the bubble burst in the Slovenian housing 
market? What has been the impact of the credit crunch? To 
help answer these questions, it is necessary to re-examine the 
definitions of a bubble burst and credit crunch.
According to the working definition, a housing bubble for resi-
dential markets is characterised by rapid price increases until 
they reach unsustainable levels relative to incomes and other 
economic  indicators.  As  explained  in  the  discussion,  house 
prices did not increase rapidly in Slovenia. On the contrary, 
they have been increasing steadily since the early 1990s. Fur-
thermore,  house  prices  already  reached  unsustainable  levels 
relative to income by the end of the 1990s. Taking into account 
these two facts (especially the latter one), the housing bubble 
ought to have burst 10 years ago. Essentially, the slowdown in 
the growth of house prices has mainly been due to reduced 
demand under circumstances of an economic recession and the 
potential threat of unemployment. The definition also speci-
fies decreases in property values that result in owners holding 
negative equity, as one of the conditions that constitute a bub-
ble burst. There is no evidence of any kind of owners hold-
ing negative equity in Slovenia. In fact, it may be argued that 
the chances of this happening in the future are minimal. The 
explanation for this lies in the conservativeness of the current 
banking system described in the introduction. Although the 
absence of traditional mortgage banking has frequently been 
criticised, the rigid lending practices of commercial banks pre-
vent the occurrence of the subprime mortgaging practices that 
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sparked the current credit crunch in the US. The circumstances 
described above make it almost impossible for the value of the 
collateral used to secure a loan to fall below the outstanding 
balance on the loan, which would then result in borrowers 
holding negative equity. At the time of writing this article, 
there was no evidence of negative equity in Slovenia. Regard-
ing this issue, mass media journalists that monitor develop-
ments in the housing sector were also consulted; they stated 
that they had no information on such occurrences. In fact, the 
possibility of this phenomenon occurring in Slovenia appears 
minimal. This conviction is based on the conservative nature 
of the Slovenian banking system, which was described in the 
introduction. The requirements that must be fulfilled in order 
to acquire large loan amounts prevent the granting of subprime 
loans. With these standards strictly adhered to, it is not pos-
sible for the mortgage to exceed the value of the property 
and, consequently the occurrence of negative equity. It may, 
therefore, be concluded that this condition for a bubble burst 
has not been fulfilled either. Another important precondition 
for a bubble burst is the housing boom. This normally occurs 
in the form of excessive home-building, which may result in an 
excessive supply of dwellings on the housing market. Whereas 
the bubble burst in Ireland is primarily attributed to a phe-
nomenal growth in property construction and the consequent 
rise in house prices, it has been shown here that the level of 
new housing construction in Slovenia has persistently lagged 
behind the level of demand. Although the ensuing shortage of 
supply has, logically, resulted in excessive price increases, there 
has been no housing construction boom that would lead to a 
burst due to a supply surplus.
Regarding the credit crunch, the working definition identified 
its major causes as a sustained period of careless and inappro-
priate lending, which results in losses for lending institutions 
and investors in debt when the loans turn sour and there is 
a reduction in the market prices of previously over-inflated 
assets. The specific events that sparked the present financial 
crisis in the US included a rise in interest rates that led to the 
fall in house prices, a sharp increase in mortgage defaults and 
a collapse in the value of subprime mortgage-backed securi-
ties. So what has been the impact of the credit crunch on 
Slovenia’s housing market? Starting with the aspect of careless 
and inappropriate lending, it has been explained above that the 
Slovenian banking system has stringent criteria governing the 
granting of loans to individuals. As such, there are no careless 
and inappropriate lending practices in this area that would lead 
to a credit crunch. More accurately, there has been no credit 
crunch in individual (natural person) housing finance. None-
theless, the financial crisis has strongly affected buyers’ market 
behaviour. As explained earlier in this paper, the economic 
crisis, growth of unemployment and stagnation of real wages 
have led to a decrease of purchasing power in general and the 
consequent reduction of demand. This is also manifested on 
the real estate market. Although banks appear to be willing 
to offer housing finance loans, some potential homebuyers are 
not eager to undertake credit burdens under circumstances of 
economic uncertainty.
Regarding bank lending activity to legal entities, on the other 
hand, no similar stringent criteria apply for the approval of 
loans to commercial investors. Like numerous banks world-
wide, Slovenian banks have fallen victim to the current finan-
cial crisis as a result of careless and inappropriate lending. The 
commercial sector most relevant to the discussion here is, of 
course, the construction industry. Due to its heavy reliance on 
speculative borrowing, the home-building sector has been hurt 
quite badly by the credit crunch. The crisis has seriously af-
fected various (small- and large-scale) investors that entered the 
market under favourable circumstances irrespective of the ap-
propriateness (or quality) of their developments. In the period 
that preceded the financial crisis, many developers took out 
huge bank loans, bought speculatively overvalued construc-
tion land and invested in mega-housing projects – expecting, 
of course, high returns from sales. As has been described in 
the case of Vegrad, the onset of the financial crisis turned the 
situation  upside  down.  Several  construction  companies  are 
experiencing serious problems and some are facing possible 
liquidation. The answer to the above question is, therefore, that 
the impact of the credit crunch in this sector was tremendous. 
Presently, it is not clear what would happen if the banks were 
to embark on a large-scale repossession of the unsold dwellings 
owned by indebted investors and then sell them off at reduced 
prices. It must be noted, however, that banks are neither in-
terested in nor qualified to execute property sales. As such, 
the banks will probably do whatever is possible to avoid such 
a course of events. Even if a large construction company were 
to go bankrupt, this does not necessarily mean that its unsold 
property would suddenly appear on the market at considerably 
lower prices. This is unlikely to happen because it is also in the 
interest of creditors (i.e., banks) to keep sales prices as high as 
possible in order to guarantee easier repayment of outstanding 
debts. Pushing debtors into bankruptcy and recovering their 
loan money through the sale of repossessed property would 
therefore be the banks’ last option. Meanwhile, there have been 
and continue to be expectations that the debtors themselves 
will start to reduce the prices of unsold property in order to 
rescue their business activity.
Finally, it is important to point out that the financial crisis 
might  have  nonetheless  impacted  the  housing  market  with 
regard to the quality of dwellings. As is widely held in expert 
circles,  greater  differentiation  between  poorer-  and  better-
quality housing is believed to be occurring for the first time 
in Slovenia’s housing market history. This may also mean that 
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the prices of poor-quality property may be expected to fall 
while those of better housing will continue to grow. Overall, 
given that demand for affordable housing continues to exceed 
supply, it is very likely that house prices will continue to rise 
in the future (probably at a slower pace), as soon as the eco-
nomic  situation  improves  and  customer  purchasing  power 
grows again.
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